


AN  
ADMONITION  
TO  
MY LORD  
PROTECTOR  
AND HIS  
COUNCIL,  
Of their present Danger.

WITH

The means to secure him and his POSTERITY in their  
present Greatness: VVith the generall Applause and lasting  
Tranquility of the

NATION.

*James Howell* *J.H.*



ADMONITION

MY LORD

COUNCIL

Of the British Empire

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES  
AND THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE DOMINIONS

NATION



# THE P R E F A C E.

MY LORD,

**M**<sup>Y</sup> passionate inclinations to the lasting peace of my Countrey, have made me so presumptuous, as to prescribe to your Highness and Council a more perfect remedy for its ill healed Wounds, than I have seen yet applied: But I would not be thought so impudent, as to offer at the instruction of so great Masters in the Art of Government, but onely to put you in mind of those things, that the multiplicity of your greater Affairs have made you forget to consider. And lest your Highness should want leisure to peruse the papers of an obscure and unknown person, I thought fit to commit them to the Press, that some of your Council or Friends (at least) may inform your Highness how much is pertinent in them, not doubting but you will think those more your friends, that give you a timely notice of your own and your Countreys danger, than those, who by a servile flattery, becalme you to your ruine; Which none shall be more ambitious handsomely to prevent, than

My Lord,

Your most humble and faithful  
Servant,

*J. H.*

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## An *Admonition* to my Lord Protector, and his Council, of their present danger, &c.



O begin such a business as this methodically, we are first to shew the just Exceptions the people and Souldiery have to this plausible elective form of Government, so well intended by your Highness and Council; next those to your persons, with the dangers ensuing thereupon to your selves and the Nation: And lastly, the onely means of a total and lasting prevention.

And I must ingenuously confess, that there is so much seeming reason to prefer the continual Election of wise and gallant men, before the Succession of Kings or Protectors, who may possibly prove Children, or Fools, or Tyrants or Cowards, that it may seem a wonder that the experience of all Nations hath not driven them to the specious form of Elective Monarchies:

But the tryals they have had, have beaten them to the contrary; for though the renown of your Highness's many victories and great abilities, with your long and prosperous prepossession of the Generalship, did silence the ambitious pretences of any Competitors in your Election, yet we must no more look for a man that hath no Equals after your Highness; for the most eminent sort of men, are as neer of a size in wit and courage, as they are in stature; and as they are equals in virtue, so will they be in interest, at least their factions will be so neer an equality, that the weaker in an Army may by his cunning and industry draw in other factions from amongst the people to increase his numbers upon the common specious pretences of a Reformation in Religion and Government agreeable to those peoples humors whom he courts, and so prepare himself to decide his pretensions by a Civil War, which I may justly call the great Sea of calamities that swallows up all the streams of other petty tyrannies, as not worth a name, in respect of the ruinous inundations of that many headed Monster, which commonly ushers in a Forraginer with it to make our miseries almost immortal.

And that this is like to be our sad fate upon the Election of every Protector, is as certain, as that all men (whether honest, or dishonest) have

have naturally an ambition to get as much power, as they can to oblige or disoblige ; and Considering how naturally men overvalue themselves, I think the designs of ambitious men to be commonly just in their own thoughts, out of the Confidence they have of themselves, of excelling others in good *Governments*. But that those gallant men who run so many hazards to build up your *Highness greatness*, should not adventure as far for themselves apart, after your *Higeness death*, were the greatest miracle that I have known.

And to confirm this by an ancient example or two, of the wisest and most civilized people then in reputation in the world ; we will begin with the great *Alexander*, who at his death (it seems intending an *Election* amongst themselves) told his great Officers, that he would leave his *Empire* to the worthiest ; but they could so ill agree who that was, that they divided that invincible Army, and each seizing upon what he could, fought it out, till they were all destroyed but *Selencus* and *Ptolomy* : And so after the death of *Julius Caesar*, was the *Roman Empire* rent by the dissensions of *Augustus*, *Anthony*, and *Lepidus*, till the fortune of *Augustus* prevailed. And in the declining of the *Roman Empire* there were several times as many Emperors as the *Legions* in several *Provinces* were pleased to set up, which were sometimes three or four together for want of a due succession. And to come home to the present *German Empire*, though it be in effect *Hereditary* to the House of *Austria*, yet the very pretence to a free election was the principal Cause of calling in the King of *Sweden*, and reducing that strong and flourishing *Empire* to such a wilderness as now it is. And doubtlesse, all Governments were to be rejected as pernicious tyrannies, were it not for avoyding the tyrannie of Confusion, which subjects the *Lives* and *Fortunes* of every particular man to any small number of *Rogues* that shall assemble at such a time of Liberty. If then the publick peace be the chief end of all Governments, those Forms must needs be the worst which are most subject to decline to *Factions*, though they do not immediately do so ; and of *Monarchies* no doubt but the elective is most lyable to this Confusion.

And though it may be objected, that the follies of a weak hereditary King may introduce the same inconvenience, I shall first answer that there is seldom such a King ; for their extraordinary educations make them knowing men, if it findes them not such. But if hee be a fool, or coward, he hath subjects under him fit to Command Armies,

mies, and no doubt a wise Council of his predecessors, who knows how to Humor and govern him as well as any of his fellow fools; And if he be a child, his minority most commonly proves peaceable, if his Title be unquestionable, But it may be said he may prove a Tyrant, and that I must confess, but so may an Elective Monarch, though he seem a lamb at his first entry, I am sure he hath more reason to be so, because he hath more of his equals or superiors in birth to fear. And if we look upon other differences of these two kinds of Kings we shall finde the Elective King more necessitated to exhaust the people, both in respect of the charge of gaining and securing his present power, and leaving his posterity like the children of Monarch, and so the Treasury shall be alwaies emptied into private purses, and the people a new exhausted by the next hungry Prince with his necessitous kindred and dependents. So that I must conclude that every election doth certainly threaten the worst of evils, and that the inconveniences of a succession are far less, and do very seldome happen by the concurrence of many ill accidents together. And I think this may serve for demonstration of the peoples exceptions, who judge by the pressures they feel. And now let us examine the distasts of the souldiery and people together to your Highness person, and I doubt wee shall finde that the greater their love and admiration once was, the more is now their hatred and your Highness danger; for they both looked upon you as a zealous reformer not only of Tyranny, but of the very causes of it; and ( though you acted beyond their reasons ) they thought it was because you had more reason then they, and so with an implicite faith they expected, from your Highness such a settlement, as should recompence their great expence of blood and treasure. But after the spirit had moved you to breake your Oathes of allegiance and supremacy ( which you took with all the Members at your first entrance into Parliament ) and after that your trust from the two houses upon the score of the Covenant, and since again to destroy the King, weed the Parliament and at last tear it up by the roots, and they in the end see no other fruits of blood & perjury, but the giving laws like a Conqueror, and imposing that kind of Government upon the souldiery which they have fought against, and indeed a worse: what can be feared from such a deluded Army and people, but that they should as boldly draw their swords together against a Protector, as the Presbiterians and all sorts of Independants did formerly against the king notwithstanding their own diffe-



rengees in opinion. Certainly they will be as little scrupulous of murdering a Monarch by his own law, as one by all the Laws of the Land established, and will think your *Highness* as guilty of the bloodshed of the *Nation*, as they once thought the *King*, and there is no question but the people who finde their *Taxes* and *Dangers* perpetuated (which were inconsiderable when they first quarrelled with them) will be as forward to assist the souldiery, as they can wish them. And I think this general disaffection of the people was so evident to your *Highness*, before they were exasperated by the death of the *King* or *Parliament*, that you need not doubt their unanimous insurrection, if they shall be prepared and countenanced in it, when the people of *single Counties* ventured their *lives* and *fortunes* so freely as they did before the *Kings* death; where it is remarkable, that a remnant of the broken and discouraged people of *Kent*, with some small additions in *Essex*, were able to divert my Lord *Fairfax's* Army at *Colechester* three moneths together; if the *Nation* had been then prepared for a general insurrection in a day, it is probable your *Highness* glories had been nipped in the bud, notwithstanding your renowned victories against the *Scots* at that time. But it may be asked, why the people did not shew this readiness when the *Scots* with their *King* came to *Worcester*, and the Answer is, that their coming was unexpected, and in such haste, as shewed they rather came to seek then give protection, and the fore-laid designs, if there were any, were (as was then pretended) discovered: But howsoever, there was little more time then was requisite for dispersing of *Orators* between the day of their arrival at *Worcester*, and that of their defeat.

But the grand *Objection* is, that the fear of the *Common Enemy* (the *King*) will always keep the *Souldiery* at Unity in their *Obedience* under your *Highness*; but I answer, that if a few of them should but resolve to murder your *Highness*, and one or two more of your principal *Officers*, which no doubt they may easily and securely do, they would find time enough to settle any form of Government they pleased, before the *Common Enemy* (who hath neither *Money*, *Shipping*, *Arms*, nor *Friends* abroad. nor any footing in this *Nation*) could give them any disturbance. And how far *zeal* may prompt those who are *religions*, and the ambition of sharing the Government those of no *Religion*, a wise man ought to fear; but admit the *King* were landed, and considerable, the *Souldiery* very well know by experience,